





alls for deposit insurance reform regularly sound the refrain to make
deposit insurance premiums more risk based.1 Those who support
such a change believe that risk-based premiums will discourage in-
suredbanksfromtakingexcessiveriskbecauseabankfacinghigherpremiums
will think twice before undertaking a risky activity.
This logic seems impeccable: Let banks face the true cost of risk and
they will appropriately balance the tradeoff between risk and return. While
seeminglycorrectfromthestandardperspectiveofpricetheory, thisargument
requires the deposit insurer to be able to observe the risk characteristics of a
bank’sinvestmentportfolio. Therearegoodreasonstothinkthatthisisnotthe
case; it is hard for outsiders to evaluate a bank loan or a complicated portfolio
of ﬁnancial derivatives. Under these conditions, risk-based deposit insurance
premiums are not enough to control moral hazard. Instead, other devices
such as performance-based insurance payments and supervisory monitoring
are needed as well.
When one party to a transaction has information that the other party does
nothave, economistsdescribethetransactionasonewithprivateinformation.
Varioustypesofinformationmaybeprivate,butIamconcernedwithapayoff-
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for giving people the right incentives.2 A simple example of state contingen-
cies is a salary plus a commission. Sales representatives are frequently paid
thiswaytogivethemanincentivetoworkhard. Incontrast,risk-baseddeposit
insurance premiums are not state contingent. They are entirely ex ante. As
we will see, this limits their usefulness as a tool to control moral hazard.
I have three goals in this article. The ﬁrst goal is to show what risk-
based deposit insurance premiums can and cannot do. Risk-based premiums
are useful for preventing transfers between different risk classes of banks, but
theycannotcontrolmoralhazard. Thisideaisnotnew. Itappearstobewidely
known among banking economists, but it rarely seems to have been formally
expressed.3 The second goal is to illustrate how state contingencies in deposit
insurance payments can be used to control moral hazard. As indicated above,
this illustration will use a model with private information. The ﬁnal goal is
to formally develop a role for supervisory activities like safety and soundness
exams. These exams are modeled as a costly means for reducing the amount
of private information between the deposit insurer and the bank.4 Most of the
literature on bank regulation takes the amount of private information as given.
But as long as these supervisory activities reduce private information, they
play a crucial role in any well-designed deposit insurance system.
The ideas in this article can be expressed with an analogy to an insurance
contract. In dealing with different risks, insurance companies do more than
adjustpremiums. Theyalsoalterdeductibleamounts,copaymentrates,andthe
probability of inspections. These contractual features are designed to prevent
the insured from altering the risks it faces in a way that is detrimental to the
insurance company, while still providing a degree of insurance. Of course,
these characteristics of the insurance contract change with the risks, so in that
sense well-designed deposit insurance contracts are risk based. Nevertheless,
the premium level is not the only thing that changes. The analogy carries
through to deposit insurance, which is why a well-designed deposit insurance
system needs to do more than make premiums risk based.
1. THE MODEL
There is a deposit insurer who insures the depositors of one bank. The insurer
is risk-neutral and has access to outside funds, so it has enough resources to
cover its exposure. For simplicity, I assume that the bank is fully funded by
2 For a survey of moral-hazard models, see Hart and Holmstrom (1987) or Prescott (1999).
3 One exception is John, John, and Senbet (1991), and there are probably others as well.
4 There is a literature on costly monitoring and auditing. Examples include Townsend (1979)
and Dye (1986).E. S. Prescott: Deposit Insurance Pricing 89
deposits.5 Ialsoignoreanyliquidityorpaymentservicesprovidedbydeposits.
For my purposes, it is sufﬁcient to treat deposits as just another form of debt.
These deposits are fully insured and pay a gross rate of return of one.
The bank has access to several investment strategies. Each strategy re-
quires one unit of capital to be invested. I assume that because of investment
indivisibilities, the bank can engage in only one strategy at a time. The return
r of each investment strategy i is uncertain. The probability distribution of re-
turnsforagiveninvestmentstrategyiswrittenf(r|i). Forsimplicity,Iassume
that only a ﬁnite number of returns are possible. The bank is risk neutral but
has limited liability. If the investment’s return is less than one, the depositors
receive everything produced by the bank plus enough of a payment from the
deposit insurer that they receive the guaranteed gross return of one. If the
return is greater than one, depositors receive a payment of one, any charges
imposed by the deposit insurer are paid by the bank, and the bank keeps the
remainder (if any) of its return.
Theobjectiveinthiseconomyistodesignthedepositinsuranceschemeso
thatthebankchoosesthehighestnetpresentvalueinvestmentproject. Because
of deposit insurance, however, meeting this objective is not straightforward.
In the following sections, I work through the following three variations on the
environment.
1. In the ﬁrst variation, I assume that the deposit insurer observes the
bank’s investment strategy. Risk-based premiums are sufﬁcient to con-
trol risk in this case.
2. In the second variation, I assume that the deposit insurer no longer
observes the bank’s investment strategy. This is the hidden-action or
moral-hazardmodel. Risk-basedpremiumsdonotcontrolmoralhazard
in this case and state-contingent payments are needed.
3. In the ﬁnal variation, I develop a role for safety and soundness exams.
The deposit insurer may spend resources that reduce (but do not elimi-
nate)privateinformation. Intheexample,theoptimaldepositinsurance
system requires an exam in addition to state-contingent payments.
Full Information
In this section, I assume that the bank’s investment decision is observed by
the deposit insurer. In this case, economists say there is full information.I ti s
under full-information conditions that risk-based deposit insurance premiums
can succeed.
5 For a related analysis of capital regulations, see Marshall and Prescott (2001) and Prescott
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Table 1 Probability Distribution of Returns
Return
Investment 0.9 1.05 1.20 E(r|i)
is 0.1 0.6 0.3 1.08
ir 0.3 0.3 0.4 1.065
Notes: Probabilities and expected return of each investment strategy. The row labeled is
corresponds to the high-mean, low-risk strategy, while the row labeled ir corresponds to
the low-mean, high-risk strategy. The last column lists the expected return or mean.
I illustrate this point with a simple example. Assume that the bank can
choose between two investment choices. One of these choices is a low-risk,
high-mean strategy, is, while the other is a high-risk, low-mean strategy, ir.6
There are three possible returns: a low one of 0.9, a medium one of 1.05, and
a high one of 1.2. Table 1 lists the probability distribution of returns f(r|i)
as well as the expected return.
The socially desirable investment strategy is is. Its expected output is
higher than that of the risky investment strategy ir. The distribution of returns
also differs between the two strategies. The safe strategy usually produces the
mediumreturnof1.05,whiletheriskystrategyismuchmorelikelytoproduce
either low or high returns.
Without Deposit Insurance
Without deposit insurance, the market prices deposits to reﬂect risk. If the
risk-free rate on deposits were zero and the bank took investment strategy is,
the depositors of the bank (assumed to be risk neutral) would require that the
deposits pay 1.011 if the bank is solvent. This would give depositors an ex-
pectedpayoffof0.1(0.9)+0.9(1.011) ≈ 1.0,whichisequaltotheirexpected
payoffiftheyinvestedinrisk-freeassets. Alternatively,ifthebanktookinvest-
ment strategy ir, a similar analysis would ﬁnd that depositors would require
a payment of approximately 1.0429 to compensate them for the increased
chance of the low return.
6 Restricting the bank to two investment strategies is done mainly for expository purposes.
Marshall and Prescott (2001) study a model where the bank can choose both the mean and variance
characteristics of its loan portfolio. They ﬁnd that the two investment strategies that mattered
the most for deposit insurance are the low-risk, high-mean strategy and the high-risk, low-mean
strategy. Restricting the investment strategies to these two choices is a stand-in for the more
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The bank’s payoff is the difference between its return and its payment to
depositors. In either case, the expected gross return to depositors is 1.0, so
the bank’s expected payoff is
E(r|i)− 1.0. (1)
Facedwiththistradeoff, thebankwouldtakethesociallydesirableinvestment
strategy, is, because E(r|is) − 1 >E ( r|ir) − 1.
With Deposit Insurance
Improperlypriceddepositinsurancemaydistortthebank’spreference-ordering
over these choices. To see this distortion, consider the situation where the de-
posit insurance premium is independent of the bank’s investment strategy.7
Because of deposit insurance, depositors always receive 1.0. With limited lia-
bility, the bank’s payoff function is max{r −1−p,0}, where 1 is the payment
to depositors and p is the premium.8 When the premium is set to zero, the
bank’s expected utility is

r≥1.0
f(r|i)(r − 1.0) = E(r|i)− 1.0 +

r<1.0
f(r|i)(1.0 − r). (2)
Comparedwithequation(1), thebank’spayoffwithoutdepositinsurance,
the bank’s utility under deposit insurance contains an additional term. This
additional term is sometimes referred to as the value of the deposit insurance
put option. It can be considered a put option because it allows the bank to
dumpitsliabilitiesonthedepositinsureratastrikepriceofzero. Itisvaluable
because with deposit insurance, risk is not reﬂected in the price of deposits.
The lower rate paid on deposits leads to an increased payoff to the bank,
the amount of which is the additional term. In essence it is a transfer from
the deposit insurer to the bank; it also illustrates why underpriced deposit
insurance can lead to a taste for risk. This last term increases as the expected
transfer from the deposit insurer increases.
This taste for risk matters in the example. If premiums are set to zero,
the bank prefers the risky strategy despite the higher expected return of the
safe strategy. In particular, the return to the bank of the risky strategy is
0.3(0.0) + 0.3(0.05) + 0.4(0.2) = 0.095, while the corresponding return of
the safe strategy is only 0.1(0.0) + 0.6(0.05) + 0.3(0.2) = 0.09.
7 For early work identifying the risk-taking incentives created by deposit insurance, see Merton
(1977) and Kareken and Wallace (1978).
8 In practice, banks pay any premiums before investing the funds. Throughout this article I
assume premiums are paid after the fact and use as our operational deﬁnition of a premium a
constant payment that is made subject to limited liability. This assumption is made because I do
not want to worry about how the deposit insurer invests the premiums it collects. The assumption
does not alter the results.92 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Risk-based premiums can deal with these perverse incentives but only if
the deposit insurer observes the investment strategy taken by the bank and
makes the premiums dependent on it. Let the insurer index premiums by the
bank’sriskstrategy, pi, andsetpremiumstobeactuariallyfair.9 Thepremium






f(r|i)(r − 1.0) =

r<1.0
f(r|i)(1.0 − r). (3)
The left-hand side is the expected value of collected premiums. The second
term on the left-hand side reﬂects the amount of funds collected by the insurer
if the bank produces enough to pay depositors but not enough to pay the full
amount of the premium. The right-hand side of equation (3) is the expected
transfer made by the deposit insurer to depositors. Later it will be convenient

































= E(r|i)− 1.0. (4)
This equation is identical to equation (1), which describes the expected payoff
to the bank under the no deposit insurance case. There is equivalence because
in the risk-based deposit insurance premium case, the premiums are set to
exactly offset the expected payments made by the deposit insurer. In the
context of equation (2), the premiums paid exactly offset the value to the bank
of the deposit insurance put option. Consequently, just as in the no deposit
insurance case, the bank will choose the safe investment strategy because it
has the highest expected return.
9Analysis of deposit insurance usually operates under the assumption that actuarially fair
deposit insurance is desirable. This mode of operation is based on the view that transfers to or
from taxpayers are undesirable. For a deposit insurance model that argues that this view may be
incorrect, see Boyd, Chang, and Smith (2001).E. S. Prescott: Deposit Insurance Pricing 93
In the numerical example, the actuarially fair deposit insurance premium
for investment strategy is is 0.011. (Recall that in this article the premium is
being assessed after the return is realized, and to be consistent with limited
liability the bank cannot pay its premium if it produces the low return of 0.9.)
The corresponding premium for the ir investment strategy is 0.0429. With
these investment-dependent premiums the expected payoff to the bank of is
is 0.08, while the corresponding payoff to the bank if it takes ir is 0.065.
Consequently, with risk-based deposit insurance premiums, the bank chooses
the socially desirable investment.
Thisexampleillustratestheargumentbehindrisk-baseddepositinsurance
premiums. Risk-based premiums control risk because premiums can be made
explicitly on the investment strategy, and if they are set to keep deposit in-
surance fairly priced, the bank faces the true costs of its investment decision.
But this result depends on the insurer being able to ascertain just how risky
a strategy the bank is taking, which it must be able to do in order to set the
premiumsproperly. Itisbynomeansclear, however, thatassessingthebank’s
strategy is an easy task. As I mentioned earlier, the quality of a bank loan may
be hard to determine, let alone the quality of an entire portfolio. Just witness
the enormous debate and controversy over how to make the Basle capital reg-
ulations reﬂect risk more accurately.10 In the next section, I will illustrate just
how important the full-information assumption is and how the conclusions
change when it is dropped. Those results will form the basis for my argument
that risk-based premiums alone cannot control moral hazard.
Private Information
To illustrate the second variation on the environment, where the bank’s in-
vestment strategy is private information, let us continue with the numerical
example. The deposit insurer sets a risk-based premium of 0.011 if the bank
takes the safe strategy and 0.0429 if it takes the risky strategy. But to imple-
ment this policy, the insurer has to know which strategy the bank takes. For
the reasons described above, this knowledge is not easy to ascertain. What if
the bank claims it is taking the safe strategy but is actually taking the risky
strategy?
I can evaluate this possibility by setting the premium to 0.011, that of the
safestrategy,andevaluatingtheexpectedpayofftothebankifittakestherisky
strategy. Its payoff in this case is 0.3(0)+0.3(1.05−1−0.011)+0.4(1.2−
1 − 0.011) = 0.0872. This expected payoff is greater than 0.08, which is
10 The 1988 Basle Accord assigned risk weights to different classes of assets and then set
a minimum capital requirement based on the sum of these risks. There has been widespread
dissatisfaction with the Accord because all loans of a particular class, such as Commercial and
Industrial loans, are treated as equally risky. A major reconsideration of the Accord is underway
right now, and the proposals for reform are based on trying to better ascertain risks at the level
of individual loans.94 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
what the bank would get if it took the safe strategy. This evaluation suggests
that the insurer cannot use the risk-based premium schedule analyzed above
to implement is.
Unlike in the previous section, the insurer does not observe the bank’s
investment strategy and the bank is therefore able to say that it is taking one
strategy while it is really taking a different one. Economists say there is pri-
vate information when information relevant to a transaction or a contractual
arrangement is known to only one of the participants. In the context of de-
posit insurance pricing, private information puts limits on the types of pricing
schemesthatcanbeused. Economistsdealwiththeselimitsbyrequiringcon-
tracts, or in this case pricing schemes, to be incentive compatible. A deposit
insurance pricing scheme and an investment strategy are incentive compatible
if under the scheme it is in the bank’s best interest to take the investment strat-
egy. In contrast, there is no such requirement in the full-information case. If
the bank changes its strategy, the premium level can change with it.
As the above analysis indicates, a ﬁxed premium and the socially desir-
able investment strategy is are not incentive compatible. The insurer can do
better, however, if it does not restrict itself solely to premiums but also allows
payments to depend on the realized return. More formally, I write these pay-
ments as p(r). A deposit insurance premium is a special case of this function
in which p(r) equals a constant.11 With this notation, I can more formally
deﬁne incentive compatibility.
Deﬁnition 1 A deposit insurance price system p(r) and investment strategy
i is incentive compatible if for all alternative investment strategies i 

r
f(r|i)max{r − p(r)− 1.0,0}≥

r
f(r|i )max{r − p(r)− 1.0,0}.
Inwords,thisdeﬁnitionsaysthatforagivendepositinsurancepricesystem
p(r), the expected payoff a bank receives from taking investment i must be
more than it would receive if it took any other possible investment strategy i .
For example, the safe investment strategy is is not incentive compatible when
the ﬁxed premium is set to 0.011. The risky investment strategy ir, however,
is incentive compatible for that same premium.
With private information, state-contingent payments may improve upon
risk-based premiums (which are not state contingent). To see this, consider
the following deposit insurance pricing scheme. If the bank produces the high
return, charge it 0.053, and if it produces the middle return, rebate to it 0.01.
Of course, no payments are made if the bank produces the low return since
the bank fails in this event.
11 Technically, in this article p(r) is only a constant when the bank has enough funds to
pay the premium.E. S. Prescott: Deposit Insurance Pricing 95
The safe investment strategy is incentive compatible for this deposit in-
surance pricing system. If the bank chooses the safe investment strategy, it
receives 0.08. (The number is unchanged from above since the price schedule
was chosen to be actuarially fair.) Furthermore, incentive compatibility holds




ratio for a given return r is the probability of r, given alternative investment




constraint reveals the following. If p(r)is set high when
p(r|i )
p(r|i) is high, a bank
that takes i  is punished relatively more than a bank that takes the desired i.
Similarly, ifp(r)issetlow(orevennegative)whenthisfractionislow, abank
that takes i  is rewarded relatively less than a bank that takes the desired i.
In this example, the likelihood ratio (when i = is and i  = ir) is high
for the high return and low for the middle return. This property of the ratio
generates the seemingly paradoxical result that the payment is higher if the
highest return is produced.12 But in this example, a low payment for the
high return would give the bank too much of an incentive to take the risky
investment strategy.13 Finally, it is worth noting that the likelihood ratio is
high for the low return as well, but because of limited liability the bank cannot
make payments to the insurer.
Figure 1 illustrates why this pricing scheme is effective. The solid line
depictsthepayofftothebankifitfacesaﬁxedpremium. Thedashedlinewith
the stars reports the payoff from a pricing schedule that collects all payments
from the bank when the bank does very well. Notice how the shapes of the
two functions differ. The solid line is convex, which means it rewards risk-
taking.14 The dashed line with the stars, while convex in portions, is basically
a concave function. It does not reward risk-taking.
The lesson of this example is that risk-based premiums cannot control
moral hazard on their own. Private information requires richer deposit insur-
ance pricing schemes that take advantage of state-contingent pricing. This
is not to say that risk-based premiums are not useful but that they are only
one component of the entire deposit insurance price system. For example, if
12 For similar results in the context of bank capital regulations, see Marshall and Prescott
(2001) or Prescott (2001).
13 One potential problem with this pricing scheme is that high returns could also reﬂect
innovation. High payments for high returns would then have the undesirable effect of punishing
innovation. The proper balance of these considerations is an open research question.
14 In the full-information case, this shape did not cause the bank to prefer the risky investment
because the premium level could change with investment strategy. Under private information, the
premium does not change with the strategy so the convex shape becomes a problem.96 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 1 Bank’s Payoff as a Function of the Return
Notes: The solid line depicts the bank’s payoff as a function of the return if it pays a
ﬁxed premium of 0.02. The dashed line with the stars represents the bank’s payoff for a
deposit insurance pricing system that charges no premium but requires a payment if the
bank produces a return greater than 1.1. For both payoff functions, the horizontal portion
reﬂects limited liability. Because of limited liability, a bank facing a ﬁxed premium has
a convex payoff function. Payoff functions with this shape create a taste for risk. (To
see this draw a line between a return on the horizontal portion of the payoff function
and a return on the increasing portion. Randomizing over these two returns is preferred
to the certain production of the expected amount.) A bank that faces the alternative price
schedule has a payoff function that is almost concave, with only a portion being convex.
Concave payoff functions create a distaste for risk.
some investment decisions are easy to observe, like the class of investments
a bank specializes in, then the analysis will contain elements of both the full
information and private information models. In this case, there could be one
pricing scheme for banks that specialize in real estate lending and another
pricing scheme for banks that hold safe assets like Treasuries. The real es-
tate lending bank might face high premiums plus state-contingent payments,
whiletheTreasury-holdingbankmightfacelowpremiumsandrelativelynon-
state-contingent payments. The pricing scheme is risk based as advocated by
proponents of risk-based deposit insurance premiums, but, as my analysis
suggests, the pricing scheme would also be state contingent.E. S. Prescott: Deposit Insurance Pricing 97
Changing the Information Structure
The previous analysis focused on how a price system with state-contingent
pricing could improve upon narrow risk-based premium systems. Indeed, the
state-contingentpricesystemwassuccessfulatimplementingthesafe,socially
desirable investment strategy. The example should not be taken, however, to
mean that state-contingent pricing can control all of the moral hazard created
by deposit insurance. In many moral hazard problems, the best incentive-
compatible contract only partially mitigates the moral hazard.
Inthissection,Iconsiderthethirdvariationontheenvironmentbyprovid-
ing a private information environment where the insurer can take some costly
action that lets it observe some of the private information. This analysis can
be used to form the basis for analyzing numerous supervisory activities like
safety and soundness exams, audits, and off-site surveillance. As we will see,
these activities can play a crucial role in a well-designed deposit insurance
pricing system.
Toillustratethisprinciple,Ireturntotheexampleusedintheabovesection.
Now, however, I assume that it costs the bank effort and resources to screen
its investment portfolio in order to identify the is investment strategy. If the
bank does not supply this effort, it cannot take the is strategy. The effort cost
translates directly into a utility loss to the bank that corresponds to a drop in
its payoff of 0.05 units. This loss is not affected by limited liability. The idea
is that this loss corresponds to effort by bank management. The bank can
choose not to supply the screening effort. If it takes this route, it saves utility
but must choose investment strategy ir. As before, I assume that the socially
desirable investment strategy is for the bank to take is.15
The incentive problem here is more severe than in the previous example.
Before it was only necessary to worry that the bank might take the risky
strategy. Now, however, it is also necessary to worry that the bank might not
screen its portfolio and then take the risky strategy by default. If it does not
screen its portfolio, it saves on the utility cost of 0.05. This additional saving
is important for the incentive constraints. In particular, the safe investment
strategy cannot be implemented with the deposit insurance pricing schedule
examined above. Furthermore, this strategy cannot be implemented for any
actuarially fair deposit insurance pricing scheme.16
15 In making this assumption, I am ignoring the utility cost to the bank in my welfare
calculation. This assumption keeps the problem simple.
16 For the example, an actuarially fair pricing scheme must satisfy
0.6p(rm) + 0.3p(rh) = 0.01,
where p(rm) is the payment made if the medium return is generated and p(rh) is the payment
made if the high return is generated. The right-hand side is 0.01 because that is the expected
payment made by the deposit insurer to the depositors.
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Whatistheinsurertodo? Letusmakeonelastadditiontotheenvironment
and allow the insurer to spend 0.02 units examining the bank. By examining
the bank, the insurer does not observe which investment strategy the bank
takes, but it can tell if it expended the effort to properly screen the projects.
Observingthiseffortcouldbeinterpretedasexaminerscheckingbanklending
procedures or resources devoted to risk management.
If the insurer examines the bank, the problem is identical to that of the
previous section except that now the insurer also has to make up the exami-
nation cost of 0.02 units from its pricing scheme. It can recover these funds
by setting the rebate to zero and raising the charge on the high return to 0.10.
Under this deposit insurance pricing and inspection system, it is incentive
compatible for the bank to screen and then take the safe investment strategy.
The exam prevents the bank from not screening and once it screens, the state-
contingent payments convince the bank to take the safe investment strategy.
Finally, the deposit insurance price system is actuarially fair (including exam-
ination costs), so no resources are transferred in or out of the banking system
in expectation.
Thekeyfeatureofthisexampleisthewayinwhichtheexaminationpolicy
changes the information structure of the bank. In this example, the informa-
tion is revealed in a straightforward manner. More generally, examinations
or other types of supervisory monitoring may only reveal signals that are par-
tially correlated with the true action. Or, supervisors may want to use the
information they receive from inexpensive information gathering methods,
like balance sheet observations, to decide whether or not they should gather
more information using more costly methods like on-site exams. All these
possibilities can be added to the framework developed in this article.
2. CONCLUSION
This article argues that risk-based deposit insurance premiums alone cannot
control moral hazard in deposit insurance. The examples demonstrate how
richer procedures with more complicated pricing schedules and examination
procedures can be more useful than risk-based deposit premiums. The critical
factor in the analysis is private information.
Interesting parallels to the analysis exist in markets without government
insurance. As was discussed earlier, insurance contracts include deductibles
and copayments and may allow for audits to control moral hazard.17 Banks
constraint
−0.3p(rm) + 0.1p(rh) ≥ 0.055.
Furthermore, the payments are subject to limited liability, which means that p(rm) ≤ 0.05 and
p(rh) ≤ 0.2. A simple graph reveals that there is no pair (p(rm),p(rh)) that satisﬁes these four
equations.
17 Experience rating is an important tool used by insurance companies that was not addressedE. S. Prescott: Deposit Insurance Pricing 99
alsotakeseveralactionstomitigatetheprivateinformationoftheirborrowers.
For example, they regularly impose covenants on their borrowers’actions and
they often list conditions under which they can call a loan.18 Just as there is
more to the price of a bank loan than the interest rate, there is more to pricing
deposit insurance than insurance premium levels.
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